India in 2005 unveiled its revolutionary design of 'A Thorium Breeder Reactor' that can produce 600 MW of electricity for two years 'with no refuelling and practically no control manoeuvres.'

Designed by scientists of the Mumbai-based Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the ATBR is claimed to be far more economical and safer than any power reactor in the world.

Most significantly for India, ATBR does not require natural or enriched uranium which the country is finding difficult to import. It uses thorium -- which India has in plenty -- and only requires plutonium as 'seed' to ignite the reactor core initially.

Eventually, the ATBR can run entirely with thorium and fissile uranium-233 bred inside the reactor (or obtained externally by converting fertile thorium into fissile Uranium-233 by neutron bombardment).

BARC scientists V Jagannathan and Usha Pal revealed the ATBR design in their paper presented at the week-long 'international conference on emerging nuclear energy systems' in Brussels. The design has been in the making for over seven years.

According to the scientists, the ATBR while annually consuming 880 kg of plutonium for energy production from 'seed' rods, converts 1,100 kg of thorium into fissionable uranium-233. This diffrential gain in fissile formation makes ATBR a kind of thorium breeder.

The uniqueness of the ATBR design is that there is almost a perfect 'balance' between fissile depletion and production that allows in-bred U-233 to take part in energy generation thereby extending the core life to two years.

This does not happen in the present day power reactors because fissile depletion takes place much faster than production of new fissile ones.

BARC scientists say that "the ATBR with plutonium feed can be regarded as plutonium incinerator and it produces the intrinsically proliferation resistant U-233 for sustenance of the future reactor programme."

They say that long fuel cycle length of two years with no external absorber management or control manoeuvres "does not exist in any operating reactor."

The ATBR annually requires 2.2 tonnes of plutonium as 'seed'. Althouth India has facilities to recover plutonium by reprocessing spent fuel, it requires plutonium for its Fast Breeder Reactor programme as well. Nuclear analysts say that it may be possible for India to obtain plutonium from friendly countries wanting to dismantle their weapons or dispose of their stockpiled plutonium.

India's Military Pitches in for Thorium Reactors

For the first time, the Indian military in its India Defence journal, said the "success" of the innovative reactor ("that can run on thorium") that the Indian nuclear scientists have designed and which will eventually do away with uranium, largely depends on US playing ball, referring to the on-going US-India nuclear agreement negotiations. U.S. in the agreement has agreed to provide India with dual-use technologies, nuclear reactors, among other "goodies", but insists that India cannot reprocess spent fuel to extract plutonium, nor can it test nuclear explosives any more.

India Defence points out that the key to the Indian design is the role of the Fast Thorium Breeder Reactor (FTBR). India's premier atomic research center, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre's (BARC's), FTBR is the first design that truly exploits the concept of 'breeding' in a reactor that uses thorium. The handful of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) in the world today--including the one India is building in Kalpakkam near Chennai--use plutonium as fuel. These breeders have to wait until enough plutonium is accumulated through reprocessing of spent fuel discharged by thermal power reactors that run on uranium.

India Defence pointed out that while the FTBR will not produce any plutonium--commonly identified as the ingredient for making nuclear explosives--the FTBR still needs an initial inventory of plutonium to kick-start the thorium cycle and eventually to generate electricity. A blanket ban on India re-processing imported uranium--a condition for nuclear cooperation with the US--could make India's thorium program a non-starter, India Defence added.

Quoting former Indian Atomic Energy Commission chairman, P.K. Iyengar, India Defence says: "The US and Russia have piles of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons," adding: "They should allow us to borrow this plutonium needed to start our breeders. We can return the material after we breed enough."

India's 30% Thorium resource base can fuel for next 2500 years of Electricity

India is trying hard to get a n-deal when it's a superpower in Thorium and stands 2nd in Thorium deposit with which it can be self sufficient for next 2500 years.

It's fate of our politicians to pledge 30 years of Abdul Kalam, Anil Kadodkar and n no of unknown Indian Scientists R&D Efforts.

Dont just support either Cong / Left / BJP. All the parties are fighting each other for what we dont need that much through this N-Deal.

See the below links and think of yourself who's dependent on whom.

Uranium is past energy, Thorium is future energy, until every other country get's Helium from Moon in 2020. So, we're unnecessarily going for a n-deal which makes our Worlds' only Thorium Plant and technology exposed to every dick and jerry country.

We need to spend more, to get costliest energy and create dependency on NSG countries for Uranium, when Indian is having almost 30% of Worlds' Thorium deposits

Fast breeder reactor - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_breeder_reactor

Quote from above URL:

"India has the capability to use Thorium Cycle based processes to extract nuclear fuel. This is of special significance to the Indian nuclear power generation strategy as India has large reserves of thorium — about 360,000 tonnes — that can fuel nuclear projects for an estimated 2,500 years. But the hitch is with the expensive nature of the construction of Fast Breeder Reactor in comparison with the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) in use. This is one of the main reasons why India is looking at the cheaper option - Uranium fuel."

- So, our only issue here is spending much on constructing the Heavy Water Reactors. But, Russia is already assisting us to minimize the cost, since they too are spending much on R&D for Thorium based reactors

India's Thorium Base - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium

So, Thorium is as common as Lead in the World, but not utilized properly, since Western countries abandoned it. Now, they want to explore the options.

A must see PPT on what US scientist analyzing on Thorium in here

US fears on India's Thorium Resources & Technology -
http://thoriumenergy.blogspot.com/2006/06/china-and-india-their-problems-are-our.html

About Thorium - http://thoriumenergy.blogspot.com/

Cost of Uranium compared with other sort of energy -
http://www.uic.com.au/nip08.htm (not that much cheaper)

Nuclear cost calculator - http://www.wise-uranium.org/nfcc.html

Coal vs Uranium Power cost - http://www.nucleartourist.com/basics/costs.htm

Various forms of energy - http://www.rationallink.org/energy.htm

Compare various energies - http://www.nucleartourist.com/basics/why.htm


After reading this what do you conclude? Just see the political fuss on this issue in our country. Why do we need to depend on America for our Energy needs, why cant we be energy independent?

Why Indian Scientists oppose Indo US Nuclear Deal

At a ceremony in the White House on Dec. 18, U.S. President George W. Bush signed the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, otherwise known as the Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The bill would enable American nuclear transfers to India to take place in the future, following a 32-year moratorium.

In India, however, the opposition to the bill remains strong within the scientific community, which believes that it would stymie India's indigenous and hard-earned thorium fuel-based nuclear program. As a result of their pointed arguments, the Manmohan Singh government has yielded to the parliamentary opposition's demand for a full discussion of the bill in India's Parliament. Although the opposition to the bill stems from two major segments of Indian society—the military and the scientific community—to the chagrin of the government, it is now actively discussed by political leaders.

On the American side, three other approvals—by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the U.S. Congress—are still needed before American nuclear transfers to India can take place. Although the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly on Dec.9 to approve the bill, amidst strong resistance put up by the nuclear non-proliferation lobby, Congress still needs to approve the technical details of nuclear trade in a so-called 123 agreement—a peaceful nuclear cooperation pact with a foreign country, under the conditions outlined in Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.

Uneasy Non-Proliferators

There is little doubt that the White House, helped by a massive lobbying team mobilized on Capitol Hill by the Indian Embassy and non-resident Indians, considers passing the bill in a relatively short period of time as a great success in bringing U.S.-Indian relations closer in the near future.

The opposition to the bill within the United States was epitomized by a letter sent to the U.S. Senate in mid-November by 18 arms-control advocates. They said that without amendments, the proposed legislation "would have far-reaching and adverse effects on U.S. nonproliferation and security objectives." Signers included Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation; Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense; Prof. Frank von Hippel of Princeton University; Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association; and John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable World.

Their concerns center around India's alleged unwillingness to curb its nuclear weapons program, India's lack of transparency in non-proliferation efforts, and its close ties with Iran. A new report by the Congressional Research Service, which examines policy issues for Congress, found that while India does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, New Delhi's "views of the Iranian threat and appropriate responses [to that threat] differ significantly from U.S. views." In 2004, Washington imposed sanctions on two Indian scientists for nuclear-related transfers to Iran, and in 2005 and 2006, four Indian companies were sanctioned for chemical-related transfers to Iran, the report noted.

In India, the opposition to the bill is based on an entirely different perspective. India has remained a non-signatory of the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) since the Treaty entered into force in 1970, following U.S. ratification. Staying outside of the NPT-regime, India has tested its nuclear devices on three occasions—once in 1974 and twice in 1998. In other words, India has developed nuclear weapons, but it is not recognized as a nuclear weapons state by the five official Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China—which had all tested their nuclear devices prior to the existnce of the NPT.

Atomic Scientists and Military

The issue of future nuclear tests is important to the opponents of the bill in India, because they consider that such tests are necessary in order to upgrade India's nuclear weapons to match nuclear developments elsewhere, and provide security to the nation. The Hyde Act that President Bush signed categorically demands that India ban all nuclear explosive tests in the future. It, however, does not address the fact that the United States itself is working on the design of a "Reliable Replacement Weapon" (RRW) to modernize its nuclear arsenal, and may indeed carry out a test in the future!

Moreover, in the "Definitions" section of the contested bill, it is clearly stated that the "Additional Protocol" is to be based on the Model Additional protocol of the IAEA applicable to non-nuclear-weapon states, which is highly intrusive, as pointed out by India's former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman, M.R. Srinivasan, in a recent article in the English news daily The Hindu.

He also pointed out that the Hyde Act makes it clear that the U.S. President has to satisfy himself that India is working actively on an early conclusion of the Fissile Material Control regime (FMCT); that India is supporting the United States in preventing the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies; and that India adheres to the Misssile Test Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines (without actually being invited to be a member of these bodies). These actions which India is obliged to take are not consistent with what "a strategic partner" (which Washington wishes India to be) should be taking. Neither are they consistent with what India—described as a "responsible state with advanced technology"—should be mandated to take, Srinivasan affirmed.

What also concerns India's defense planners about the bill, is the way it has been formulated. The Hyde Act calls for achieving a moratorium on the production of fissile material for explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China. It may be recalled that China has been producing fissile material for weapons purposes for a long time, while India was not allowed to by the NWS. Therefore, stopping production of fissile material at the same point of time would lead to a serious imbalance. The statement of policy goes on to say that the United States shall "seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination."

India's Thorium Program Is the Issue

Indian scientists have made their views known about the inadequacy of the Hyde Act, citing two specific areas. First, the bill says categorically that India cannot reprocess spent fuel from its reactors. it demands this because the United States claims that the "no reprocessing" clause would prevent India from getting plutonium, which could be used later for making nuclear weapons. However, there is more to the clause than meets the eye, Indian atomic scientists point out.

India decided on a three-stage nuclear program back in the 1950s, when India's nuclear power generation program was set up. In the first stage, natural uranium (U-238) was used in pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). In the second stage, the plutonium extracted through reprocessing from the used fuel of the PHWRs was scheduled to be used to run fast-breeder reactors (FBRs). The plutonium was used in the FBRs in 70% mixed oxide (MOX)-fuel, to breed uranium-233 in a thorium-232 blanket around the core. In the final stage, the FBRs use thorium-232 and produce uranium-233 for use in the third stage reactors. (See Ramtanu Maitra, "Thorium: Preferred Nuclear Fuel of the Future," EIR, Nov. 18, 2005.)

To a certain extent, India has completed the first stage, although it has realized a dozen nuclear power plants so far. The second stage is only realized by a small experimental fast breeder reactor (13 MW), at Kalpakkam. Meanwhile, the Indian authorities have cleared the Department of Atomic Energy's proposal to set up a 500 MW prototype of the next-generation fast-breeder nuclear power reactor at Kalpakkam, thereby setting the stage for the commercial exploitation of thorium as a fuel source.

One reason for India's commitment to switch over to thorium, is its large indigenous supply. With estimated thorium reserves of some 290,000 tons, it ranks second only to Australia. Further, the nation's pursuit of thorium helps to bring independence from overseas uranium sources. Since India is a non-signatory of the NPT, its leaders foresaw that its civil nuclear-energy-generation program would be constrained in the long term by the provisions laid down by the commercial uranium suppliers. The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group demand that purchasers sign the NPT and thereby allow enough oversight to ensure that the fuel (or the plutonium spawned from it) is not used for making nuclear weapons. A non-signatory of the NPT is prevented from receiving any nuclear-related technology and nuclear fuel.

India already began the construction of the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) in 2005. The AHWR will use thorium, the "fuel of the future," to generate 300 MW of electricity—up from its original design output of 235 MW. The fuel for the AHWR will be a hybrid core, partly thorium-uranium 233 and partly thorium-plutonium.

In other words, if India cannot reprocess the spent fuel to secure plutonium for the sake of converting thorium into fuel, the thorium reactors will never take off. Separation of plutonium is essential for the eventual use of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India therefore expects that reprocessing will be an important activity of its nuclear energy program This is what has put the Indian atomic scientists on a warpath against the Singh government's willingness to accept the bill.

Natural uranium contains about 99.3% of the isotope uranium-238 and 0.7% of the fissionable isotope uranium-235. Although uranium-235 is the rarer of the uranium isotopes, it is the one that most readily undergoes nuclear fission, and is thus the most useful for common nuclear applications. Therefore, to use uranium, the proportion of the uranium-235 isotope found in natural uranium must be increased. This process of increasing the fraction of uranium-235 in natural uranium is called enrichment. At the same time, one must note that while uranium-235 is present in natural uranium in small amounts, uranium-233 does not exist in nature. Therefore, thorium-232 must be converted to uranium-233 in order to generate nuclear power.

Not an Easy 123

The second concern of the Indian scientists is the scope of "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation" (Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act) that was promised to India in July 2005. India had assumed that this term encompassed the fuel cycle, namely enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel. In the discussions leading to the adoption of the Hyde Act, U.S. legislators argued that the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 specifically forbids export of these technologies, as also heavy water production technology, to other countries. India has developed its own technologies in these three important areas.

According to an English news daily, The Times of India, India's top atomic scientists have spelled out some of the key points to be incorporated in the 123 agreement are:

* India should not be asked to participate in international non-proliferation efforts with a policy congruent to that of the United States.

* There should be full-scale civilian nuclear cooperation, with an assurance of constant fuel supply.

* India should be free to carry out more nuclear weapons tests.

United States Offers India Thorium Based Nuclear Reactors

While India is still debating how to make the Indo-US nuclear deal work, an American company, anxious to enter the Indian market, has offered to build commercial nuclear power reactors in the country.

These reactors will rely entirely on India's thorium resources -- except at the start - and thereby remove the objections of critics.

The California-based Dauvergne Brothers Inc (DBI) says its novel type of thorium breeder reactor is fuelled with fissile material like uranium only once when it is started. It runs for its full operational life on Uranium-233 (or U-233) bred in its core from thorium.

Thorium, which India has in plenty, cannot be directly burned in a reactor. It has to be converted into fissile U-233. India's own thorium utilisation strategy hinges on reprocessing -- a contentious issue between India and the US. The DBI claims its design is tailor-made for the Indian situation.

According to the company, its reactor 'starts up using conventional uranium-based nuclear fuels, and incrementally converts to an all-thorium fuel cycle over a period of 10 years, using India's abundant supply of thorium ores to maintain energy independence'.

It said that computer simulations of the DBI thorium breeder reactor show that a single load of 25 percent uranium oxide fuel and 75 percent thorium oxide will keep the reactor running for a decade.

'In that time enough U-233 will be bred in the thorium oxide fuel to increase the output power of the DBI reactor core by 50 percent adding only fresh thorium oxide as fuel.' After that, no uranium ores are needed.

Conventional breeder reactor designs -- including the one contemplated by Indian scientists -- require chemical reprocessing to retrieve bred fuel from used uranium fuel rods or from irradiated thorium' blankets'.

The DBI reactor, according to the company, uses a different strategy.

After approximately 10 years of operation, much of the activated thorium fuel would be transferred without any reprocessing into a second-generation DBI reactor core with higher power output than the first.

'Fresh thorium breeder bundles will be added to perpetuate the cycle.'

This fuel plan relies on a robust, low-neutron absorbing, radiation-resistant, proprietary fuel encapsulation system developed by DBI, the company said.

Unlike the zirconium fuel cladding of most breeder reactors, the DBI fuel capsules are derived from industrially available material, much less expensive than nuclear-grade zirconium alloys.

While the modular core design offers scalability, several other features of the DBI thorium reactor programme could prevent weapons proliferation, the company claims.

For instance, it says the start up fuel could be a proliferation-resistant fuel, such as the denatured plutonium/thorium fuel recently developed by Thorium Power Inc, another US company.

'International agreements between India and uranium-source nations to use proliferation-resistant fuels in the DBI Reactor Programme, subject to IAEA monitoring, could sever the link between civilian and military nuclear programmes in India, without adversely affecting India's ability to scale up the DBI Reactor Programme using native thorium in future generations,' the company said.

India's nuclear power programme Can move ahead even without US support

As the Dispute on 123 agreement goes on in Indian Polity and row continues between the Left parties,BJP and the Congress Government, a key aspect from the Indian viewpoint is that India has certain inherent strengths in the area of nuclear technology, which would enable India to forge ahead, albeit slowly, even without US cooperation.

Central to this argument is the availability of huge reserves of thorium in India. Thorium reserves have been estimated to be between 3,60,000 and 5,18,000 tonnes. The US estimates the “economically extractable” reserves to be 2,90,000 tonnes, one of the largest in the world. Our uranium reserves, by contrast, are estimated to be at a maximum of around 70,000 tonnes.

India currently has 15 commercial power reactors in operation, most of which are pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR) which use natural uranium. Two Tarapur reactors are boiling water reactors (BWR) which need enriched uranium, which has to be imported.

Together they generate about 3300 MWe (Mega Watt Electrical) of power, about 4 per cent of that generated from all sources. Another six PHWRs are in construction, and along with the two “VVER” Russian built 1000 MWe reactors which use enriched uranium, they would add about 3960 MWe by 2008. The goal is to reach at least 20,000 MWe by 2020.


India's uranium reserves are low. Obtaining enriched uranium for the two Tarapur reactors and VVER type reactors requires the consent of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups countries, including Russia. This is where the agreement with the US is expected to be beneficial to India.

Also central to India's success in achieving these goals, is the harnessing of thorium, for which India has developed a three-stage nuclear programme. India has already developed and tested the technologies needed to extract energy from Thorium, but large scale execution has not yet been possible, mainly because of limited availability of Plutonium.

Stage one is the use of PHWRs. Natural uranium is the primary fuel. Heavy water (deuterium oxide, D2O) is used as moderator and coolant. The composition of natural uranium is 0.7 percent U-235, which is fissile, and the rest is U-238. This low fissile component explains why certain other types of reactors require the uranium to be “enriched” i.e. the fissile component increased.

In the second stage, the spent fuel from stage one is reprocessed in a reprocessing facility, where Plutonium-239 is separated. Plutonium, of course, is a weapons material, which goes towards creating India’s nuclear deterrent.

Pu-239 then becomes the main fissile element, the fuel core, in what are known as fast breeder reactors (FBR). A test FBR is in operation in Kalpakkam, and the construction for a 500 MWe prototype FBR was launched recently by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh.

These are known as breeder reactors because the U-238 “blanket” surrounding the fuel core will undergo nuclear transmutation to produce more PU-239, which in turn will be used to create energy.

The stage also envisages the use of Thorium (Th-232) as another blanket. Th-232 also undergoes neutron capture reactions, creating another uranium isotope, U-233. It is this isotope which will be used in the third stage of the programme. Thorium by itself is not a fissile material, and cannot be used directly to produce nuclear energy. The Kamini 40 MWe reactor at Kalpakkam which became critical in Sept 1996, using U-233 fuel, has demonstrated some of these technologies.

India is currently developing a prototype advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) of 300 MWe capacity. The AHWRs, which use plutonium based fuel, are to be used to shorten the period of reaching full scale utilisation of our thorium reserves. The AHWR is thus the first element of the third stage. AHWR design is complete but further R and D work is required, especially on safety. It is expected to be unveiled soon and construction launched.

In the third phase, in addition to the U-233 created from the second phase, breeder reactors fuelled by U-233, with Th-232 blankets, will be used to generate more U-233.

The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre has estimated that India's thorium reserves can amount to a staggering 3,58,000 GWe-yr (Giga Watt Electrical - Year) of energy, enough for the next century and beyond

BARC scientists are also looking at other designs, like an advanced thorium breeder reactor (ATBR) which requires plutonium only as a seed to start off the reaction, and then use only thorium and U-233. Here the plutonium is completely consumed and this reactor is thus considered “proliferation resistant”. A Compact High Temperature Reactor also under development at BARC . This reactor is designed to work in closed spaces and remote locations.

Success in harnessing thorium’s potential is thus critical for the India’s future energy security.

India has put in place mechanisms for ensuring safety and security of nuclear facilities. The regulatory and safety systems ensure that equipment at India's nuclear facilities are designed to operate safely and even in the unlikely event of any failure or accident, mechanisms like plant and site emergency response plans are in place to ensure that the public is not affected in any manner. In addition, detailed plans, which involve the local public authorities, are also in place to respond if the consequences were to spill into the public domain. The emergency response system is also in a position to handle any other radiation emergency in the public domain that may occur at locations, which do not even have any nuclear facility.

Regulatory and safety functions of Atomic Energy in India are carried out by an independent body, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). The AERB was constituted on November 15, 1983 by the President of India under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 to carry out certain regulatory and safety functions under the Act. The regulatory authority of AERB is derived from the rules and notifications promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986. The mission of the Board is to ensure that the use of ionizing radiation and nuclear energy in India does not cause undue risk to health and the environment.

India Needs Thorium Breeder Reactors

An effort is afoot in India and Russia to initiate research on developing small, sealed thorium breeder reactors for a wide range of uses throughout the world. The most interested party in this development is India, the most obvious reason being that India is a power-starved nation that has developed the entire nuclear-fuel cycle, including the thorium-fuel cycle, and while India is low in uranium reserves, it probably has the largest thorium reserves in the world.

But the plan to develop these reactors is not simply developing nuclear-based power sources. Large nuclear power plants are available all over the world, and even the Indian nuclear industry, under pressure from the industrial and urban sectors, is in the process of developing nuclear reactors with capacity upwards of 500MW.
Small Reactors in Clusters

But, 80% of India's population lives in rural areas, and almost 60% of the workforce depends on agriculture. A vast majority of India's water consumption is in the agricultural sector, and the entire population depends very heavily on annual monsoon rains, which can be extremely irregular, causing devastating droughts, which threaten India's food security. At the same time, India's coastline stretches about 3,570 miles on the mainland, from the border of Bangladesh in the Northeast to Gujarat in the Northwest. More than 600 million people live, bounded by an ocean on one side or the other. And, yet the vast majority of them lack safe, clean water.

The lack of power, massive shortfall of water, and the potential to pull millions out of poverty within the span of a generation, are the primary motivations behind the research on thorium reactors. These small thorium-fueled reactors, which would breed uranium-233 to generate power, can be placed all across power-short and water-short nations, and bring about a surge in economic development not seen before. The power from these small reactors will provide the power requirement for agriculture, small and medium-size industries, desalination of seawater and brackish water to make clean potable water, and also to meet the requirement of all commercial and domestic uses. The beauty of these reactors is that when power demands would grow, another one of these reactors can be placed to form a cluster.

The list of benefits of developing these small reactors by no means ends here. There are other benefits of significant dimensions. For instance, to set up these small reactors would require a reasonably small infrastructure, and since the power output will be commensurate with the local population and their activities, power generated from these reactors would be consumed locally. This would eliminate the 12-15% line losses that occur regularly when power is put on large and long grids, and prevent the instability produced in a crucial national electrical power grid, that results when a huge amount of power is dumped, or withdrawn, from that grid. Equally important is the fact that since these reactors are small, their construction and operation would not disrupt people's lives the way large infrastructure-based power plants do. The population living in the rural areas would be able to maintain their way of life, traditions, and environment, and at the same time, have a quality of life they could not have because of endemic shortfall of power and water.

Sealed Safe

But these reactors, now in the concept stage, are even more interesting. Since these reactors would be sealed "for life," removal of fissile material from the reactor core, enclosed within a tamper-proof cask, will not be possible. The whole system would be protected by a network of security alarms. These reactors generate power without requiring either refueling or maintenance. In contrast, conventional nuclear reactors are under constant attack of the anti-nuclear groupies who point at the potential threat of proliferation because these reactors must be charged periodically with new fuel, which later has to be removed for replenishment: both steps allow an opportunity for fissile material to be diverted to weapons programs.

The basic objective of the research is to develop a sealed reactor which will have a lifespan of about 30 years. At the end of this life span, the reactor would be buried in the same sealed condition. For these reactors to generate power without any outside intervention, the sealed reactor would need to be of the fast-breeder type. Thorium-232, a non-fissile material breeds fissile uranium-233, which is the desired breeder-fuel.

It is not clear at this early stage what exactly the overall configuration of these reactors would be. It is expected that the reactors would be small, about 10-15 feet in girth and about 45-50 feet in height. The weight could be as little as 200 tons. These reactors, once they become operational, would produce power uninterrupted for a generation. There will be no down time, since there will be no refueling involved. At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Northern California, a similar project, using uranium-238 as fuel, is in progress. Known as the small, sealed, transportable, autonomous reactor (SSTAR), the machine will generate power without needing refueling or maintenance. To extend the reactor's life, the cylindrical core of the SSTAR will be engineered to sustain fission only when surrounded by a metal cylinder that reflects neutrons back into the fuel. This metal mirror will start at one end of the core, and over the course of the reactor's lifetime, move slowly along to the opposite end, consuming the fuel as it goes.

Clearly, the challenge in developing the thorium-fueled reactors would lie in getting the breeder to breed fissile uranium-233 continuously in such a way that it meets the power demand for three decades or so. The added challenge, of course, will be to compartmentalize the fuel so that uranium-233 becomes always available. To produce uranium-233, atoms of thorium-232 are exposed to neutrons. Thorium-233 forms when thorium-232 absorbs a neutron. Thorium-233 has a half-life of about 22 minutes and decays into protactinium-233 through beta decay. Protactinium-233 has a half-life of about 27 days and decays into uranium-233, also through beta decay. If completely burnt up through fission, one pound (0.45 kilograms) of uranium-233 will provide the same amount of energy as burning 1,500 tons (1,350,000 kilograms) of coal.

Towards an Energy Independent India

"Today,India is the only developing country that has demonstrated its capability to design, build, operate and maintain nuclear power plants,manufacture all associated equipment and components,and produce the required nuclear fuel and special materials,"

says Dr.R.Chidambaram, Chairman,Atomic Energy Commission , India.



The Indian Energy Scenario

India is a country occupying 2% of the world's land mass and currently generating about 2% of the global electricity, mostly using low grade coal of which it has about 5% of the world reserves.

India has, however a share of 16% in the world's population. To achieve a modestly high level of economic growth, the domestic generation capacity needs to be increased at least tenfold, to about 900 GWe. Even with full utilisation of all existing commercially exploitable domestic hydrocarbon, hydroelectric and non-conventional resources, this level of increased generation capacity cannot be sustained for more than a few decades. For a large country like India, bulk imports of fuel or energy are neither affordable nor strategically prudent.

The Role of Nuclear Power

The Indian Uranium reserves -about 0.8% of the world - cannot contribute to any significant improvement in the situation if this Uranium is used on once-through basis and then disposed off as waste. However, with a carefully planned programme, the available Uranium can be used to harness the energy contained in non-fissile thorium, of which India possesses about 32% of the world's reserves. The first stage of this programme involves using the indigenous uranium in Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) which efficiently produce not only energy but also fissile plutonium. In the second stage, by reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel and using the recovered plutonium in Fast Breeder Reactors, the non-fissile depleted uranium and thorium can breed additional fissile nuclear fuel, plutonium and uranium-233 respectively. In the third stage thorium and uranium-233 based nuclear reactors can meet the long term Indian energy requirements.

The Indian concerns and priorities are thus quite unique. For its long term energy security India has no option but to deploy nuclear power according to a strategy precisely tuned to its needs and resources.

Early History of Evolution of the Indian Nuclear Programme

Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha formulated this strategy nearly 40 years ago, when India possessed hardly any infrastructure to support the nascent nuclear technology. The first Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, helped Bhabha lay the foundations of the Indian atomic energy programme with self-reliance as the motto. Accordingly a large R & D establishment named Atomic Energy Establishment housed in Trombay, was progressively set up. This establishment, renamed Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) after India tragically lost Bhabha in an air crash in 1966, operates research reactors, basic facilities for nuclear research, supporting infrastructure and trained man-power in all disciplines dealing with nuclear energy.

The Indian nuclear power programme commenced in 1969 with the building of the twin units of Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS), employing Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), with American assistance. The reason for this choice lay in favourable performance guarantees for these reactors, and a need to quickly gain experience in running nuclear power plants.

The first two Indian PHWRs, RAPS-1, RAPS-2, were taken up for construction as a joint venture with Canada. In parallel, the Department of Atomic Energy set up facilities for fabrication of fuel, Zirconium alloy components, manufacture of precision reactor components, and production of heavy water. The import content of RAPS-1 was 45% and the half of its first core fuel charge was indigenously produced using high standards of quality demanded by the specifications. Commercial operation of RAPS-1 commenced in December 1973.

In the year 1974, after the peaceful nuclear experiment conducted by India at Pokharan, the Canadian support was abruptly withdrawn. RAPS-2 was under construction then. France too, followed suit by refusing to supply fuel for the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) which was then under construction with French assistance. The USA expressed its inability to continue fulfilling its contractual obligations to supply fuel for TAPS. The era of technology control regimes had thus begun for the Indian nuclear programme.

Coping with the Pokharan Fallout

The sudden withdrawal of foreign technical assistance and supplies would have caused an irrecoverable set back to the Indian nuclear programme, if not its collapse. This did not happen on account of Indian determination to face the challenges head-on with the help of the R & D infrastructure already created to develop self-reliance, and the support of the Indian industry. The challenges included not only the continuation of the on going activities without external help but also the pursuit of the originally stipulated long term strategies.

To cut the long story short, while causing delays in some ongoing projects, the embargoes spurred the growth of an indigenous capability of developing substitutes for the denied products, technologies and knowhow. RAPS-2 started commercial operation in 1981; FBTR went critical in 1985, using indigenously made plutonium-uranium mixed carbide fuel. India also developed a plutonium-uranium mixed oxide fuel, and facilities for its industrial scale production, as an alternative to the enriched uranium based fuel for TAPS. India has not looked back since then, and has continued to proceed on its chosen path without depending on external help.

The Present and the Future

Today, India has ten nuclear power reactors in operation. The designs of its new reactors have progressively evolved to incorporate advanced features to further improve safety, reliability and economics.It has successfully developed the technologies for in-service inspection, maintenance and refurbishment of the older plants.Four PHWRs are currently under construction and another ten are planned for construction in the near future .These include the 500 MWe PHWRs fully designed and developed in India .Further, to accelerate the growth of nuclear power, it is contemplated to build a few light water reactor based plants with foreign collaboration.The immediate objective is to achieve 20,000 MWe of nuclear generation capacity by the year 2020.

Indian heavy water plants and zirconium alloy components manufacturing facilities have consistently met not only the domestic requirements but also export commitments.The Indian fuel fabrication facilities are capable of manufacturing a wide range of nuclear fuel based on natural uranium ,enriched uranium,plutonium , and uranium-233.Plants for treatment and disposal of various types of radioactive wastes have been set up and are operating as an integral part of every nuclear facility in the country .The fuel reprocessing facilities for extracting plutonium from spent fuel of the PHWRs are already operational.

Technologies associated with the fast reactor programme have been mastered .The indigenous efforts for the installation of first 500 MWe prototype FDR have begun and the design has been optimised .

India is an emerging leader in the development of reactor and associated fuel cycle technologies for Thorium utilization .A 30 KW(Th) research reactor KAMINI has become operational last year and is perhaps, one of its only kind in the world currently operating with uranium-233 based nuclear fuel .India's Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) which employs thorium based fuel , has several advanced passive safety features, and goes beyond the requirements generally stipulated for the next generation nuclear power plants, currently being developed.

Today, India is the only developing country that has demonstrated its capability to design , build , operate and maintain nuclear power plants, manufacture all associated equipments and components and produce the required nuclear fuel and special materials .With assured government support during the IXth Five Year Plan,which started this year the future of nuclear power in India is bright and ,in fact, the target of 20,000 MWe by the year 2020 is considered by some people in the Indian industry as conservative .

'Thorium to give India an edge'

Thorium Power is a privately-held, Washington DC-based company funded primarily through private equity investments. It develops proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel technologies. Seth Grae, president, Thorium Power, talks to ET about why thorium is the way forward for India.

Besides the fact that India has the second largest reserves of thorium, are there any other advantages for opting for thorium-based nuclear reactors rather than the uranium-based plants?
There are two major concerns when we talk of nuclear power — the first is that of safety and the second is the proliferation issue. On the aspect of safety, major nuclear companies like GE, Westinghouse, and Areva have addressed this issue. It is the proliferation angle that now needs to be addressed. For India, which has the largest thorium reserves in terms of quality, opting for thorium-based reactors is the logical step.

It is not merely an issue of fuel self-sufficiency but the fact is that it will also address the proliferation issue. Nuclear waste at a thorium-based reactor is minimal, and the plutonium from the process is used for further generation. It would make sense for India to opt for thorium rather than uranium.

Are there any other advantages for India to opt for the thorium fuel cycle?

Given India’s vast reserves of thorium, harnessing technologies that would use thorium-based nuclear fuels would give India an edge. The country could emerge as an exporter of thorium material or fuels made out of thorium. Also, given India’s massive power generating capacity expansion programme, opting for a thorium fuel cycle would make sense.

There are two types of thorium-based nuclear fuels — thorium and uranium and the other, thorium and plutonium. With the first, uranium, will come at a cost while plutonium comes free as it is a by-product of the process. The most dramatic savings happen if you use plutonium. However, fuel accounts for only 6% of costs of a nuclear plant. Indian scientists have already done work on thorium, that puts India in a favourable position.
Given thorium’s obvious advantages what accounts for its lack of popularity as a nuclear fuel?
The fact is that there has been little research and development in the nuclear fuel field. R&D in this area has been somewhere between flat and dead in the past 25 years. Thorium Power has an advantage as developing anything in the nuclear sector requires a long-time. Thorium Power’s work in the past will give it an edge over companies that are just about starting to explore this field.

What are your plans in India?

Thorium Power is the leading developer of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel technologies. While working with Thorium Power designs will put India in a favourable position, we too stand to benefit from scientists in India to develop nuclear fuel for domestic consumption as well as for export.

What is the nature of association that you are looking at in India?

India has the potential to build at least 60 reactors of 1,000 megawatts each. India is already working on a plan to build dozens of new reactors in the coming years and the vast majority of them will be designed to use thorium fuels. We have found a lot of interest among all segments of the nuclear community here in the proliferation resistant, low-waste fuel technology that Thorium Power offers.

We are still exploring options, it could be in the nature of a technology transfer partnership or a joint venture. However, in international transactions things can develop fast. We may be in a position to announce a joint venture by the middle of next year. We are in dialogue with the Nuclear Power Corporation of India and NTPC as well as some major private sector companies.

How big do you estimate the Indian market to be?

Indian efforts in the nuclear power sector could lead to the award of contracts worth at least $100 billion. As I said, India has the potential to build at least 60 reactors of 1,000 megawatts each. At an estimated $2 billion per reactor, the potential for business crosses $100 billion.

Over and above this, there are business opportunities arising out of fuel supply and servicing contracts. Consider that 60% of business generated by new plants involves construction and equipment contracts and the balance to fuel processing technologies and safety services.